武装通信与电子协会（AFCEA）指挥官TechNet印度-太平洋会议（记录致辞）

ADM菲尔·戴维森（Phil Davidson） | 美国印度太平洋司令部公共事务办公室| 2021年3月1日

ADM Phil Davidson
美国印度洋-太平洋司令部
夏威夷，檀香山，
2021年3月1日，已 
准备交付 

大家好！我希望此消息能使您身体健康。参加第一个虚拟TechNet确实是一种荣幸。

我要感谢Dick Macke海军上将，AFCEA International和AFCEA Hawaii使这次活动成为可能。

尽管COVID提出了挑战，但您为召开这次会议所做的努力表明了应对印度太平洋动态安全挑战所需的适应性，创新性和毅力。

我很高兴有机会在指挥期间第三次与该小组讲话。

在我的首次露面时，我向您介绍了“自由和开放的印度太平洋”构想，以及它如何推动我们的联合部队努力并塑造了我们在该地区的做法。

然后在2019年，我讨论了中国对自由开放的印度太平洋的构想的战略威胁，特别侧重于信息领域。

今天，我想分享我在接下来的几周内向国防部和国会传达的信息的预览。

我的目的是提供一个总体背景，为您在本次会议期间的讨论提供参考。

希望它将在接下来的几天之内进一步激发您的专业领域内的对话，辩论和深入思考。
现在，作为我作为战斗指挥官的职责的一部分，我必须按照《国防授权法》（NDAA）的指示，向国会提交两份正式文件。

两者是完全独立但互补的，并且为了便于讨论，它们讲述了印度太平洋的故事。

第一个是我的年度态势声明，该声明提供了印度太平洋剧院安全环境的总体状况–它加强了我在国会面前的年度证词听证会。

第二个是独立评估，概述了印度国防军司令部最紧迫的作战要求，以告知太平洋威慑倡议（PDI）。

这项倡议是国会在21年财政年度制定的，其目的是解决由于我们从大国竞争中面临的威胁而导致的联合需求缺口。

从根本上说，态势陈述和独立评估都是围绕一个基本事实构建的：

我们在印度太平洋地区面临的最大危险是对中国的传统威慑力量的削弱。

如果没有有效和令人信服的常规威慑力量，中国将大胆采取行动，取代已建立的以规则为基础的国际秩序。

我们在印度太平洋地区的联合部队必须摆出姿势，以提供可靠的战斗威慑力量，以保护通过空中，海上，陆地，太空和网络空间自由和开放地进入贸易路线。

为了有效地威慑，我们需要为联合部队配备适当的能力，能力，权力和原则，以支持快速的部队使用，准确的进攻力量和有效的防御。

我们必须证明并传达我们的意愿，以及我们对眼前政治目标的承诺。

我们必须说服北京，以军事力量实现其目标的代价实在是太高了。

印度国防军正在采取向前部署的纵深威慑态势，以捍卫祖国，并在全球范围内保护我们的价值观和利益。

通过这样做，我们将通过展示能力，能力和意志来否认中国的目标，并在必要时对中国军队施加成本，从而实现有利的安全环境。

从本质上讲，我们的部队必须具有机动性（如果愿意的话，则要敏捷），并且必须具有深厚的多领域火力才能获得阵地优势；我们必须利用一系列可互操作且兼容的盟友和伙伴，并且我们必须定期表现出拒绝和击败的“威慑力”。

为了实现所有这些目标，有四个主要重点领域可以指导INDOPACOM在该地区提供可靠的常规威慑力量的方法。

首先，我们必须增加我们的联合杀伤力。

基本设计是一个整合的联合部队，它可以否定敌方在海洋，空中，陆地，太空和网络领域中的统治能力，进而支持我们自己在各个领域进行控制和投射的能力，有时是周期性的，有时是坚持不懈。

我们的联合部队必须更充分地整合其网络能力，太空部队，特种作战部队以及装备有空中火力和海上部队远程火力的地面部队，以展现“致命性”，这是使对手处于危险之中的有效威慑力量。

而且，仅靠防御还不够-用导弹抓弹是我们最难的事情-如果威慑力失败，我们还必须保持强有力的进攻和胜利。

我们的投资和现代化工作必须利用领先技术网络所提供的先进功能，例如：

集成的防空和导弹防御系统，采用分布在该地区的多个传感器和拦截器来保护–不仅包括美国在内的国土，而且我们的美军也前进。

这些防御措施还必须利用，整合和保护我们的关键盟友和合作伙伴。

在关岛等固定地点建立的功能强大，适应能力强且经过验证的系统（如AEGIS）将从第二岛链提供持续的360度综合空导弹防御。

我们拥有数十亿美元的军事能力和基础设施，众多的指挥与控制节点，维修，后勤和维持设施，以及成千上万的美国公民在关岛进行保护和保卫。

在夏威夷，国土防御雷达-夏威夷（HDR-H）代表了我们检测，跟踪，辨别和击败弹道，巡航和高超音速导弹威胁的能力缺口的解决方案。

远程精确打击可让“紧缩”距离和环外距离的各种目标集处于危险之中。

这些先进的武器系统意义重大，绝对需要集成的跨部门和跨系统设计，以释放联合部队的全部潜力。

战斧，SM-6，LRASM，HIMARS和远程超音速飞机的部署只是这些远程火力的几个例子，这需要我们的对手考虑在防御系统上进行进一步的投资。

联合指挥与控制（C2）网络在决策过程中提供了速度和灵活性，从而可以渗透并分解对手的系统，从而挫败了他们的进攻能力。

战术多用途地平线以上雷达（TACMOR）将为国际日期变更线以西的空中和地面目标提供持久，远程，探测和跟踪的能力。

此功能将通过对该区域的空中和地面目标进行大范围的检测和跟踪来显着提高我们的态势意识，并提供预警以防止突发袭击。

此外，具有快速重访率的天基持久雷达群可提供维持对PLA活动的态势感知的增强能力。

人工智能，量子计算，遥感，机器学习，大数据分析和5G技术的结合将提供必要的感知，C2和深火能力，以支持我们在任何竞争舞台上的机动力量。

的确，这些能力是在危机中威慑日常的关键推动力，并且是我们战斗和获胜能力的关键。

第二，我们必须增强力量设计和姿势。

过去50年对该地区的历史考察突显了我们在1970年代从越南，泰国和台湾撤出并在1990年代从菲律宾撤出之后，美国部队的态势发生了变化。

现在，我们正在从对东北亚和关岛的以服务为中心的历史性重心向适应更加统一和分散的联合部队蓝图转变。

这包括修改我们与盟国和合作伙伴的印太部队编队，以应对中国的快速现代化。

我们在该地区的部队设计和姿势必须能够使多个领域的能力融合，并在没有集中的情况下创造质量优势。

这是通过在战区的广度和深度上分布向前部署的联合力量，同时平衡杀伤力和生存能力来实现的。

通过前向和轮流联合部队持久存在是证明我们对北京的承诺和决心同时确保盟友和伙伴的最可靠方式。

这种向前的存在使联合部队能够维持这些部队在更长的时间内支持作战行动。

它需要具有维持力和力量保护作用的威慑态势，以使其具有韧性，生存力和可支撑性。
第三个重点领域是加强我们的盟友和伙伴。

我们的盟友和合作伙伴群是自由和开放的国际秩序的基础，它提供了强大的力量来抵制恶性活动和侵略。

我们正在寻找一切机会，以增加与盟友和合作伙伴的联合行动，演习和培训的频率和强度。

即使面对COVID大流行，我们也正在提高整个地区的互操作性和兼容性，以增强我们的能力并改善我们的竞争协调能力。

这体现在信息共享协议，外国军售，扩大的军事合作以及诸如TechNet之类的国际安全对话中，旨在解决我们与最亲密的盟友和合作伙伴之间的共同安全问题。

任务合作伙伴环境（MPE）是一项关键投资，可提供弹性和冗余的联合以及组合的命令和控制，以在所有领域进行竞争。

从战略层面到战术层面，MPE将通过访问跨所有领域发挥作用的多域传感器网络，提供剧院范围内的战斗管理和自动化决策。

该环境使用基于云的技术，集成系统和安全的访问控制来向我们的盟友和合作伙伴提供有保证的C4ISR。

为了配合这些信息共享功能，我们必须拥有一个强大的命令和控制网络以实现可互操作的执行。
我们正在开发一种集成架构，以通过使用南亚，东南亚和大洋洲的信息融合中心，在志趣相投的国家之间横向扩展数据共享。

这些融合中心将结合并分析飞机，轮船和天基系统的传感器数据，在美国，我们的盟友和我们的合作伙伴之间建立共同的海上图景，以改善对潜在的非法捕鱼，贩运活动和跨国公司的集体监视威胁。

第四个也是最后一个重点领域是演习，实验和创新-不仅在联合部队内部，而且还包括我们的其他盟友和合作伙伴。

应对安全挑战并展示我们在当今动态运行环境中的决心的最有效方法是通过联合试验和高保真，多领域培训的持续运动。

为了实现这一目标，我们正在寻求在该地区关键地区建立一个实时，虚拟和建设性范围的联合网络。

不幸的是，我们当前的范围，测试和/或培训设施是由每个部门（有时是由其服务测试和开发社区）分别构建的，而很少考虑联合部队。此外，他们没有获得资金来开展联合培训。

联合部队必须有能力通过可访问的，大规模的，全域的和综合的范围，大规模地提高能力，以支持关键的联合训练和联合训练。

INDOPACOM是众多服务和国家培训，测试以及操作范围和相关设施的所在地，并且紧邻该地区。

一些基于CONUS的联合示例包括：

V范登堡空军基地的西部靶场，
海军空战中心，点穆古和加利福尼亚州中国湖的武器部测试场，
N内利斯空军的内华达州测试和培训中心基地，
欧文堡的国家培训中心和ev内华达州的法伦靶场训练场。

该地区还有一些OCONUS设施：

联合太平洋阿拉斯加山脉综合体（JPARC），
at位于考艾岛Barking Sands的太平洋导弹靶场设施（PMRF）和大岛上的Pohakuloa训练靶场（PTA），以及
on夸贾林环礁上的里根试验场（RTS）。

将我们在该地区的美国战场与日本和澳大利亚的盟军战场整合在一起，将使我们能够在装备齐全的现场虚拟建设性试验场中提高联合能力和联合能力，而这是我们的盟国和合作伙伴目前所没有的。

一支由美国和盟军组成的综合部队，定期展示其在各个领域的作战行动，对潜在的对手提出了新的挑战和困境。

当然，最好的方法是通过高端，多领域的联合练习。

我们正在将我们的联合演习计划现代化，使其成为一系列在西太平洋随时间和空间有意链接的联合演习和联合演习。

INDOPACOM联合演习计划将整合现有的靶场，训练区域和测试设施，以产生部队的战备能力，测试新兴能力并满足战区需求。

的确，先进的“联合演习计划”与“联合范围网络”相结合，使我们能够揭示我们希望对手看到的某些能力，并隐藏我们不希望他们看到的事物。

这是任何威慑策略的主要组成部分。

最终状态是一个综合联盟，可以有效地展示所有领域的行动，确保我们的国际准则得到保护，并阻止潜在对手采取军事行动。

美国必须与我们的盟国和合作伙伴一道，实施一项不断发展的常规威慑战略，以证明其能力，能力和赢得竞争的意愿。

我在INDOPACOM的团队做了出色的工作，为该地区设计了一个框架，以推动在竞争，危机和冲突中获胜所需的战略举措和运营理念。

现在，我需要您的帮助来进行此设计，并继续在剧院中进行改进。

这是通过促进创新，批判性思考，发展专业知识，具有挑战性的假设以及共同努力实现联合部队的全部潜力来实现的。

我们所有人都在推动联合部队应对印度太平洋地区未来的安全挑战和机遇方面发挥了作用。

我感谢您今天的时间，以及您希望改善印度太平洋（实际上是地球上最关键的地区）的繁荣与安全的愿望。

全文英文原文：

AFCEA TechNet Indo-Pacific Conference

By ADM Phil Davidson | U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Public Affairs Office | March 1, 2021

ADM Phil Davidson
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association (AFCEA) TechNet Indo-Pacific Conference (Recorded Remarks)
HONOLULU, Hawaii
1 March 2021 
As Prepared for Delivery 

Aloha everyone! I hope this message finds you well and in good health. It is truly a pleasure to participate in the first virtual TechNet.

I would like to thank Admiral Dick Macke, AFCEA International, and AFCEA Hawaii for making this event possible.

Your efforts to host this conference despite the challenges presented by COVID demonstrates the type of adaptability, innovation, and perseverance needed to address the dynamic security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

I am grateful for the opportunity to address this group for the third time while in command.

In my first appearance, I spoke to you about the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and how it drives our Joint Force efforts and shapes our approach in the region.

Then in 2019, I discussed China’s strategic threat to the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific with special emphasis on the information domain.

Today, I would like to share a preview of the message I am delivering to the Department of Defense and Congress over the next few weeks.

My intent is to provide an overarching context that informs your discussions during this conference.

Hopefully it will also spark further dialogue, debate, and deep thought within your professional circles, well beyond the next few days.
Now, as part of my duties as a combatant commander, I am required to submit two official documents to Congress – as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act (the NDAA).

The two are entirely separate but complimentary and – for ease of discussion – they tell the story of the Indo-Pacific.

The first is my annual posture statement that provides the overall status of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific Theater – it reinforces my annual testimony hearing before Congress.

The second is an independent assessment outlining INDOPACOM’s most pressing warfighting requirements to inform the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (or PDI).

The initiative was established by Congress in Fiscal Year 21 specifically to address joint requirement shortfalls given the threats we face from Great Power Competition.

Foundationally, both the posture statement and independent assessment were constructed around one fundamental truth:

The greatest danger we face in the Indo-Pacific region is the erosion of conventional deterrence vis-à-vis China.

Without a valid and convincing conventional deterrent, China will be emboldened to take action to supplant the established rules-based international order.

Our Joint Forces in the Indo-Pacific must be postured to provide combat credible deterrence to protect free and open access to trade routes through the air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace.

To effectively deter, we need to arm the Joint Force with the proper capabilities, capacities, authorities, and indeed the doctrine to support rapid force employment, accurate offensive power, and effective defenses.

And we have to demonstrate – and communicate – our will – and our commitment to the political object at hand.

We must convince Beijing that the costs to achieve its objectives by military force are simply too high.

INDOPACOM is pursuing a forward deployed, deterrence-in-depth posture to defend the homeland and protect our values and interests globally.

In doing so, we will achieve an advantageous security environment by demonstrating the capability, capacity, and will to deny China’s objectives and – if necessary – to impose costs on their military forces.

At the heart of it, our forces must be maneuverable – agile if you will – and have the depth of multi-domain fires needed to achieve positional advantage; we must leverage an array of interoperable and compatible allies and partners, and we must regularly demonstrate the “deterability” to deny and defeat.

To accomplish all of this, there are four key focus areas that guide INDOPACOM’s approach to providing combat credible conventional deterrence in the region.

First, we must increase our joint force lethality.

The fundamental design is an integrated Joint Force that can deny an adversary’s ability to dominate the sea, air, land, space, and cyber domains – and in turn, support our own ability to control and project in all domains, sometimes periodically, and sometimes persistently.

Our Joint Force must more fully integrate its cyber capabilities, space forces, special operations forces, and ground forces equipped with long-range fires with air and maritime forces to present the “lethality” – the effective deterrent that holds an adversary at risk.

And it is not enough to play defense alone – catching missiles with missiles is the hardest thing we do – we must also maintain a strong offense to fight and win should deterrence fail.

Our investments and modernization efforts must harness the advanced capabilities provided by a network of leading-edge technologies, such as:

Integrated Air and Missile Defenses that employ multiple sensors and interceptors distributed across the region to protect – not only the Homeland including our U.S. territories, but also our U.S. forces forward.

These defenses must leverage, integrate, and protect our critical allies and partners as well.

A highly capable, fully adaptable, and proven system – like AEGIS – established in fixed locations like Guam, will deliver persistent 360-degree, integrated air missile defense from the Second Island Chain.

We have billions of dollars in military capability and infrastructure, numerous command and control nodes, repair and logistics and sustainment facilities, and thousands of U.S. citizens to protect and defend in Guam.

And here in Hawaii, the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) represents the solution for the gap in our ability to detect, track, discriminate, and defeat ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats.

Long Range Precision Strike to hold at risk a variety of target sets from distances both “in the clinch” and from outside the ring.

These advanced weapons systems are significant and absolutely require an integrated, cross-Service and cross-system design to unleash the full potential of the Joint Force.

The deployment of Tomahawk, SM-6, LRASM, HIMARS, and Long Range Hypersonics are but a few examples of these long range fires that will require our adversaries to consider further investment in defense systems.

Joint Command and Control (C2) Networks provide speed and flexibility in decision-making, which allows penetration and then disintegration of an adversary’s systems, thereby defeating their offensive capabilities.

The Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR) will provide a persistent, long-range, detect and track capability of air and surface targets west of the International Date Line.

This capability will dramatically increase our situational awareness with wide-area, detection, and tracking of air and surface targets in the region and provide early warning to prevent surprise attacks.

Additionally, a constellation of Space-Based Persistent Radars with rapid revisit rates to provide the ability to maintain a heightened situational awareness of PLA activity.

The combination of artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, remote sensing, machine learning, big data analytics, and 5G technology will provide the necessary sensing, C2, and deep fires capabilities to support our maneuver forces in any contested arena.

Indeed, these capabilities are critical enablers to deter day-to-day, in crisis, and key to our ability to fight and win.

Second, we must enhance our force design and posture.

A historical look at the region over the past 50 years highlights the shift of our U.S. force posture as we moved out of Vietnam, Thailand, and Taiwan in the 1970s and then out of the Philippines in the 1990s.

Now, we are adapting from our historic Service-centric focus on Northeast Asia and Guam toward a more integrated and distributed Joint Force blueprint.

This includes revising our Indo-Pacific force laydown with our allies and partners to account for China’s rapid modernization.

Our force design and posture in the region must enable the convergence of capabilities from multiple domains and create the virtues of mass without concentration.

This is accomplished by distributing a forward-deployed, joint force across the battlespace's breadth and depth while balancing lethality and survivability.

Persistent presence thru forward-based and rotational joint forces is the most credible way to demonstrate our commitment and resolve to Beijing, while simultaneously assuring allies and partners.

This forward presence allows the Joint Force to sustain these forces to support combat operations over extend time periods.

It requires a deterrent posture that possesses the sustainment and force protection to be resilient, survivable, and supportable.
The third focus area is strengthening our allies and partners.

Our constellation of allies and partners is the backbone of the free and open international order, providing a powerful force to counter malign activity and aggression.

We are seeking every opportunity to increase the frequency and intensity of our combined operations, exercises, and training with our allies and partners.

Even in the face of the COVID pandemic, we are increasing our interoperability and compatibility across the region to enhance our capabilities and improve our coordination for competition.

This manifests itself in information sharing agreements, foreign military sales, expanded military cooperation, and international security dialogues – such as TechNet – designed to address our mutual security concerns alongside our closest allies and partners.

The Mission Partner Environment (MPE) is the critical investment that provides for resilient and redundant joint and combined command and control to compete across all domains.

From the strategic to tactical level, MPE will provide theater-wide battle management and automated decision-making by accessing a multi-domain sensor network that functions across all domains.

This environment uses cloud-based technologies, integrated systems, and secure access controls to provide assured C4ISR with our allies and partners.

To accompany these info-sharing functions, we must have a robust command and control network for interoperable execution.
We are developing an integrated architecture to horizontally expand data-sharing among like-minded nations through the use of information fusion centers in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.

These fusion centers will combine and analyze sensor data from aircraft, ships, and space-based systems, building a common maritime picture between the U.S, our allies, and our partners to improve our collective surveillance of potential illegal fishing, trafficking activities, and transnational threats.

The fourth and final focus area is exercises, experimentation, and innovation – not only within the Joint Force – but with our other allies and partners as well.

The most effective way to combat the security challenges and demonstrate our resolve in today’s dynamic operating environment is through a continuous campaign of joint experimentation and high-fidelity, multi-domain training.

To accomplish this, we are pursuing the development of a joint network of live, virtual, and constructive ranges in key locations around the region.

Unfortunately, our current range, test, and/or training facilities are built separately by each Service – sometimes by their Service test and development community – and rarely with the Joint Force in mind. Further, they are not funded to enable joint training.

The Joint Force must have the ability to advance capability at scale – through accessible, large-scale, all-domain, and integrated ranges to support critical joint and combined training and exercises.

INDOPACOM is home to – and in close proximity to – numerous Service and national training, testing, and operational ranges and related facilities.

Some CONUS-based, joint examples include:

 The Western Range at Vandenberg Air Force Base,-
 The Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division test ranges in Point Mugu and China Lake, California,-
 The Nevada Test and Training Center at Nellis Air Force Base,-
 The The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, and-
 The Fallon Range Training Complex in Nevada.-

And there are also several OCONUS facilities in the region:

 The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC),-
 The Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) at Barking Sands on Kauai and the Pohakuloa Training Range (PTA) on the Big Island, and-
 The Reagan Test Site (RTS) on the Kwajalein atoll.-

Integrating our U.S. ranges in the region with allied ranges in Japan and Australia will allow us to advance joint and combined capability and capacity in a fully instrumented live-virtual-constructive proving ground – something our allies and partners do not have currently.

An integrated U.S. and coalition force that regularly demonstrates operations across all domains presents new challenges and dilemmas to potential adversaries.

Certainly, the best way to accomplish this is through high-end, multi-domain, joint exercises.

We are modernizing our Joint Exercise Program into a series of joint and coalition exercises deliberately linked over time and space in the Western Pacific.

The INDOPACOM Joint Exercise Program will integrate existing ranges, training areas, and test facilities to generate force readiness, test emerging capabilities, and drive theater requirements.

Indeed, an advanced Joint Exercise Program – combined with a Joint Range Network – provides us the ability to reveal certain capabilities we want our adversaries to see and conceal the things we do not want them to see.

This is a major component of any strategy of deterrence.

The end state is an integrated coalition that can demonstrate operations effectively in all domains, assuring our international norms are protected and dissuading potential adversaries from military action.

The United States – alongside our allies and partners – must implement an evolving conventional deterrence strategy that demonstrates its capacity, its capability, and its will to win this competition.

My team at INDOPACOM has done an exceptional job designing a framework for the region to drive the strategic initiatives and operational concepts required to win in competition, crisis, and conflict.

Now, I need your help to take this design and continue to advance it in the theater.

This is done by fostering innovation, thinking critically, developing expertise, challenging assumptions, and working collectively to realize the full potential of our Joint Force.

We all play a part in advancing our Joint Force for the future security challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific.

I thank you for your time today and for your desire to improve the prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific – indeed, the most critical region on the planet.

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