Unlike many of his colleagues in the Beijing foreign policy scene, he does not frequent seminars and workshops with Western counterparts. He has remained noticeably apart from the "jet-set" of Beijing talking heads that are racking up（上货）thousands of airline miles with monthly visits to various think tanks in Washington.

　　文章用“racking up”（上货）这个贬义词来表达美国战略学界对一天到晚往美国跑的公知的鄙视。  

　　谎言说一千遍就会变成真理，可只有把谎言当真理的人，才能将谎言说一千遍。开始美国人在利用这些人，可后来就真信他们了。他们英文好，还拿了美国的钱，可他们喋喋不休地把美国精英给忽悠倒了。通过这篇文章可看出美国战略学界现在悔的肠子都青了，并因此恨死他们。 

　　在“一手交钱，一手交货”的特朗普治下，将来这些人的好日子到头了。同样中国面临的真正挑战也就来了。因为只有尊重对手的敌人才是可怕的。

　　图片来源：Wikimedia/DoD photo by Linda D. Kozaryn

张文木是中国外交政策 争论中的一个重要人物

美国《国家利益》杂志网站2015年4月11日文章

　　【全文提要】

 

　　张文木是中国外交政策争论中的一个重要人物。

　　不像许多在中国外交政策领域的他的同事，他并不是很经常和西方的那些同行们进行研讨和切磋。他总是和那些每月飞行数万里到华盛顿与不同的智库交流的北京官方发言人的浮夸讲究保持明显的距离。

　　张在北航（即前北京航空航天大学）工作，导致他缺失了许多其他著名中国战略家所拥有的清华，北大和复旦的学术背景。不过这点也正好帮他树立了“真正的中国战略家”的名声，因为他拒绝被西方的机构和教条所迷乱和吸引。

　　张毫无疑问地在新世纪的中国战略史上留下了印记。他是中国第一批真正的“海军至上主义者”之一，早在其他学者愿意支持这个新观念之前他就建议中央政府建造航空母舰。他2009年出版的《论中国海权》提出，中国的全球商业力量必须要有一个可以用来支撑它的强大海军，而也许正是这一说法为他赢得了“中国马汉”的称号。

　　张的观点看起来似乎不能够反映通常意义上的那种追求圆滑和政治正确的中国官方外交政策。虽然他也许会被描述成中国战略家中的“鹰派人物”，但是张本人也警告了中国不应该错误追求其他大国力量已开始着手追求的那种“过度扩展”。然而，他的作品像是一个及时的警钟，提醒中国，如果中国不重复莫斯科四面出击，分散力量的前车之鉴，中国将会更加生机勃勃。

原标题：当心：中国可能在亚洲复制一个“克里米亚”

　　张文木，是中国外交政策争论中的一个重要人物。

　　不像许多在中国外交政策领域的他的同事，他并不是很经常和西方的那些同行们进行研讨和切磋。他总是和那些每月飞行数万里到华盛顿与不同的智库交流的北京官方发言人的浮夸讲究保持明显的距离。

　　张在北航（即前北京航空航天大学）工作，导致他缺失了许多其他著名中国战略家所拥有的清华，北大和复旦的学术背景。不过这点也正好帮他树立了“真正的中国战略家”的名声，因为他拒绝被西方的机构和教条所迷乱和吸引。

　　张毫无疑问地在新世纪的中国战略史上留下了印记。他是中国第一批真正的“海军至上主义者”之一，早在其他学者愿意支持这个新观念之前他就建议中央政府建造航空母舰。他2009年出版的《论中国海权》提出，中国的全球商业力量必须要有一个可以用来支撑它的强大海军，而也许正是这一说法为他赢得了“中国马汉”的称号。

　　即使许多张的观点现在看起来像是中国战略家的传统观点，他仍有其独特的方法，并时常清晰地强调他那些违反常规的观点。例如，在2009年的时候，他曾提到中国应该避免任何在南中国海争端的重要介入，因为他观察到这样可能会分散与台湾统一的中心目标。

　　张一直以来都是个多产的作家。他的一篇长文首次发表在中国著名学术杂志“国际政治”2014年出版的期号上。而这篇文章之前又正在被重新出版，这暗示了它的重要性。而这篇文章的名字是“乌克兰事件的世界意义及其对中国的警示”。

　　较早一版的龙眼新闻杂志专栏透露到，另一位知名中国战略家曾暗示普京如今在中国广受追捧。而在同一个专栏，我个人也强调到，至少还有一些中国军事学者也同样追捧俄罗斯在2014年对于克里米亚半岛的大胆占领。

　　在深入探索张文木关于乌克兰危机的思想的过程中，这一版的龙眼挖掘到一些更为深入的理解，而这些理解正是关于发生在东欧的重要事件对迅速演变的亚太地区局势的冲击。

　　根据张的表述，俄罗斯在与西方的斗争中取得了重要的胜利，同时他也表示普京是个很厉害的战略家。张毫不掩饰地表示乌克兰危机是中国收获的一个重要经验教训。张认为莫斯科的胜利是因为对于俄罗斯来说，克里米亚是生死攸关的问题，而对于欧洲来说，克里米亚只是众多重大问题的其中之一。“从克里米亚的角度来说，俄罗斯会运用它的所有资源来源，而西方则不会。”张认为许多苏联领导人不是太鲁莽（例如赫鲁晓夫）就是太理想主义（例如戈尔巴乔夫），但是他同时坚持认为，普京继承了斯大林的现实主义和“克制”。

　　在评价俄罗斯的地缘潜能时，张推测说，“......从历史的观点上说，俄罗斯的力量本来可能不会被投送到很远的地方，但是就投送到东边的乌克兰来说，并不是什么难事。”他更暗示到，普京的崛起，多多少少，都是不可避免的，因为“......处在危机中的国家会诞生属于它自己的强大领导人。”但是他解释说，普京成功阻止了北约向东扩张的重要基础还是因为全民共识的形成。由于中国也面临相似的地缘冲击，张断言，中国也许也应该发展这种强大的国民意识。

　　既然现在普京阻止了北约向东前进，张写到“......西方开始将他们的目光放在中国身上。他们想从中国身上得到一个答案：到底什么是中国的底线？而对于中国来说，对中国而言，西方人最大的冒失便是他们极度轻狂。”

　　当转到更为迫切的发展中的中俄关系的问题上时，张很明确地表示：“在新世纪美国外交政策的最大错误便是将中国推向俄罗斯。”在这点上，他观察到一个很有趣的地方：“如果不是中俄边界的稳定性，俄罗斯在2014年占领克里米亚的行为是不可想象的。”

　　他认为近年来的美国领导人，诸如乔治·布什总统或者希拉里·克林顿国务卿“只会纸上谈兵而无任何战略头脑。”在他看来，美国的“亚洲中心战略”代表着“美国企图回到1950年代在中国周边制造包围圈的举动。”

　　这个中国战略家认为乌克兰危机之后世界政治将明晰化。在这一方面，他对他的那些还秉持着“只要严格坚持法律......就会慢慢解决这些问题”观点的中国同事们保持着批判的态度。

　　同样地，他也不认为中国应该相信“软实力”。他写道：“......俄罗斯人并不信任‘软实力’，反而宁愿直接任用坦克去解决问题。”他同时十分反对那些坚持“别跟美国斗，美国是老大，跟老大斗是没好结果的”的中国学者的观点。他强调道，“这种想法是谬误的”。为了阐明这种中国式服从政策的谬误，他指出在美国的国家发展史过程中，美国并没有回避与当时的霸权英国直接冲突，并且得到了好结果。他警告他的国民应该与绥靖主义作斗争，他认为如果中国向西方屈服，那么西方必然会更加得寸进尺。至于说华盛顿，他引用了来自毛泽东的话“......美国......看起来是很可怕，其实只是个纸老虎......”

　　在文章最后的总结处，他认为中国应该寻求更加强有力的外交手腕，因为他观察到现在贸易遍布全球，并且受到政治的深深影响。然而，他有理有据地认为现今中国需要一个“安全空间”，没有这个“安全空间”，中国是不会真正安全的。这个空间应该用来保护中国东部沿海的“黄金地带”，张还将台湾看作是中国安全的重要瓶颈，因为它牵制了中国海上力量的全面发展，而中国海上力量的全面发展就是这个“黄金地带”和中国终极安全的重要保障。他问道“我们是否可以实现台湾统一的目标呢？”同时他自己回答说：“是的，我们可以，在乌克兰危机中，普京可以将他的安全地带一路推进到克里米亚南部，但是北约却没有任何办法，因为克里米亚对北约的力量而言已是鞭长莫及......”

　　综上所述，张的观点看起来似乎不能够反映通常意义上的那种追求圆滑和政治正确的中国官方外交政策。虽然他也许会被描述成中国战略家中的“鹰派人物”，但是张本人也警告了中国不应该错误追求其他大国力量已开始着手追求的那种“过度扩展”。然而，他的作品像是一个及时的警钟，提醒中国，如果中国不重复莫斯科四面出击，分散力量的前车之鉴，中国将会更加生机勃勃。

　　原 文

　　Get Ready： China Could Pull a 'Crimea' in Asia

　　Zhang Wenmu [张文木] is a major fixture of the Chinese foreign policy debate.

　　Unlike many of his colleagues in the Beijing foreign policy scene, he does not frequent seminars and workshops with Western counterparts. He has remained noticeably apart from the "jet-set" of Beijing talking heads that are racking up（上货） thousands of airline miles with monthly visits to various think tanks in Washington.

　　Toiling away at Beihang University (previously the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics), he lacks the academic pedigree of more famous Chinese strategists at Tsinghua, Peking, or Fudan Universities. But maybe this has only increased his reputation as a "real Chinese strategist" that refuses to be dazzled and charmed by Western institutions and doctrines.

　　Zhang has unquestionably left a mark on Chinese strategy in the new century. He was one of China's first genuine "navalists," calling for Beijing to build an aircraft carrier well before other scholars were willing to get behind the new approach. His 2009 book On Chinese Sea Power [论中国海权] argues that Chinese global commercial power must have a formidable navy to support it, which may one day earn him the title of “China's Mahan.”

　　But even though many of Zhang's ideas now seem like conventional wisdom among Chinese strategists, he still has a unique approach and will occasionally articulate positions that go quite against the grain. For example, in 2009 he cautioned that China should avoid any major involvement in the South China Sea dispute, observing that such an approach might distract from the central goal of unification with Taiwan.

　　Zhang continues to be a prolific writer. A lengthy essay of his appeared in a late 2014 issue of the prestigious Chinese academic journal International Politics[国际政治]. The essay was being republished, suggesting its importance. Its title is “The Meaning of the Ukraine Events for the World and also their Warning to China.”

　　An early edition of this Dragon Eye column revealed another eminent Chinese strategist suggesting that Putin was now very widely admired among Chinese. In that same column, I also demonstrated that at least some Chinese military thinkers similarly admired Russia's bold seizure of Crimea in early 2014.

　　In probing the thoughts of Zhang Wenmu on the Ukraine Crisis, this edition of Dragon Eye seeks for a deeper understanding of the impact of the major events in Eastern Europe on the evolving situation in the Asia-Pacific.

　　According to Zhang’s rendering, Russia has won a major victory against the West and Putin is a master strategist. Zhang is not shy about proclaiming the Ukraine Crisis as affording a major “经验教训” [lesson of experience] for China. Zhang states that Moscow triumphed because for Russia, the Crimea is a matter of life and death, while for Europe it is simply one of many important issues. “For [Crimea], Russia would commit all its resources, but the West would not do so.” Zhang recognizes that many Soviet leaders were either reckless (e.g. Khrushchev) or excessively idealistic (e.g. Gorbachev), but he maintains that Putin has followed Stalin’s pattern of realism and even “克制” [restraint].

　　Appraising Russia’s geopolitical potential, Zhang surmises, “… historically, Russian power could not be projected very far, but as for reaching eastern Ukraine, there’s no problem at all.” He further suggests that the rise of Putin was, more or less, inevitable because “… a nation in the midst of crisis tends to produce its own vigorous leader.” But he explains that the basis of Putin’s success in “halting NATO’s eastward expansion” lies ultimately in the formation of “全民共识” [national consensus]. China may also develop such a powerful national consensus, asserts Zhang, with a similarly important geostrategic impact.

　　Now that Putin has halted NATO’s eastern march, Zhang writes “… Westerners begin to cast their gaze upon China. They will certainly demand an answer from China: where is China’s bottom line?  For China, the most offensive mistake made by Westerners is that they are extremely frivolous.”

　　Turning to the ever more pressing issue of developing Russia-China ties, Zhang states unequivocally: “The biggest error in U.S. foreign policy in the new century has been to push China in the direction of Russia.” In that light, he makes the interesting observation that “if there had not been stability on the Chinese-Russian border, Russia’s seizure of Crimea during 2014 would been impossible to imagine.”

　　He opines that recent American leaders such as President George W. Bush or Secretary of State Hillary Clinton “only know empty rhetoric and have no strategic sense.” In his view, the U.S. “Pivot to Asia” represents “an attempt to return to the 1950s American intention to create a ring of encirclement around China.”

　　This Chinese strategist views the Ukraine crisis as a moment of clarity in world politics. In that respect, he is highly critical of his Chinese colleagues who maintain that “strict adherence to the law...will smoothly resolve all issues.” Likewise, he does not believe that China should put its faith in “soft power.” He writes: “… the Russian people did not rely on ‘soft power,’ but rather directly employed tanks to resolve the problem.” He also argues strongly against Chinese scholars who maintain: “…别跟美国斗, 美是老大, 跟老大斗是没好结果的” [do not struggle against the United States. The United States is the boss. A struggle with the boss will not have a good result]. “Such thinking is mistaken,” he states emphatically. To illustrate the fallacy of a submissive Chinese policy, he suggests that during its own period of national growth, United States did not shy away from direct confrontation against then hegemon Great Britain with good results. Warning his countrymen against appeasement, he says that if China does not stand up to the West, then the West will inevitably “得寸进尺” [given an inch, seek for a mile]. As for Washington, Zhang quotes Mao Zedong saying that “...the United States...may appear to be a huge monster, but is actually a paper tiger….”

　　At the conclusion of the essay, Zhang seems to argue for a more muscular Chinese diplomacy, observing that trade is everywhere deeply impacted by politics. However, he is most forceful and clear in arguing that China now requires a “安全空间” [security space], without which it cannot be truly secure. This space is intended to protect China’s “黄金地带” [golden belt] along the eastern seaboard and Zhang views Taiwan as the key bottleneck, holding in check the full development of Chinese sea power that will enable protection of this zone and ultimate security for China. Asking rhetorically if “we can achieve this goal [of unification with Taiwan],” Zhang answers his own question by saying that “yes, we can. In the Ukraine Crisis, Putin was able to extend his security zone all the way to the south of Crimea, but NATO had no recourse, because [Crimea] lay beyond the reach of its power….”

　　As stated above, Zhang’s views likely do not represent the outlook of the majority of the Chinese foreign policy establishment, which is generally more polished and politically correct.  While he might be described as a “hawk’s hawk” among Chinese strategists, Zhang himself does warn China against the wrong-headed pursuit of “过于扩展” [excessive expansion] undertaken by the other great powers. Nevertheless, his writing still serves as a timely reminder that Beijing, should it opt to follow Moscow’s lead, could actually be much more “assertive” than pitching sand about and parading around various reefs with lightly armed cutters.

　　Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute(CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.   

　　文章来源：http://nationalinterest.org/feature/get-ready-will-china-pull-crimea-asia-12605?page=2